߲jx PdZddlZddlZddlZddlZddlZddlZddlmZddl m Z m Z ddl m Z mZmZmZmZmZmZddlmZddlmZej0eZdZed d hZej<ej>zZ d e!fd Z"d e#d e#fdZ$ehdZ%d e#d e e#fdZ&eddhZ'dZ(ee(Dchc]}ejR|c}e(Dchc]}ejRd|zc}zejRdhzZ*e+ddDZ,edhZ-dZ.ej^dZ0ej^dZ1e+ddDZ2d\a3a4d\a5a6d e!fd Z7d e!fd!Z8dUd"Z9d e+fd#Z:d e+fd$Z;d%e e#d e#fd&ZdVd'e#d+e e?fd,Z@d-e d e fd.ZAd-e d e!fd/ZBd-e d e!fd0ZCd-e d e!fd1ZDd e#d e!fd2ZEd'e#d3e#d e!fd4ZFd-e d5e!d e e#fd6ZGd e#d e!fd7ZHd e#d e!fd8ZIGd9d:eJZKd%e#d+e?d3e#d eLe#fd;ZMGd<d=ZNGd>d?eNZOGd@dAeNZPdBe d eQe+e#e?fe#ffdCZRedDe dBe fdEZSdFdGdHe dDe dIe!d dfdJZTdFdGdKe dIe!d dfdLZUdMe d e fdNZVdMe d e fdOZWdPe d e e#fdQZXd e#d e!fdRZYdMe d e fdSZZdMe d e fdTZ[ycc}wcc}w)WuWURL safety checks — blocks requests to private/internal network addresses (SSRF). ``security.allow_private_urls: true`` disables private-IP blocking (DNS that resolves public names to private ranges); cloud metadata hostnames/IPs are **always** blocked. 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N)contextmanager)AnyOptional) parse_qslquoteunquoteurljoinurlparseurlsplit urlunsplit)get_hermes_home_override)is_truthy_value) HTTPS_PROXY https_proxy HTTP_PROXY http_proxy ALL_PROXY all_proxyhttphttpsreturnc.tdtDS)Nc3ZK|]#}tjj|%ywN)osenvironget).0vs 5/home/ubuntu/.hermes/hermes-agent/tools/url_safety.py z'_proxy_is_configured..#s:Qrzz~~a :s)+)any_PROXY_ENV_VARSr _proxy_is_configuredr&"s :/: ::r%urlc t|ts|S|j}|s|Stjdd|} t |}|jjtvr|S|j|j}}|r9 |jdjd}||k7r|j||d}d}t!|j|t#|j$|t#|j&|dzt#|j(|dzfS#t $r|cYSwxYw#t$r|}YwxYw) uASCII-safe HTTP URL for Hermes-owned URL tools (IRI -> URI, e.g. ``https://wttr.in/Köln``). Preserves URL syntax and existing percent escapes while IDNA-encoding the host and percent-encoding non-ASCII path/query/fragment text. 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Priority: ``HERMES_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS`` env, ``security.allow_private_urls``, legacy ``browser.allow_private_urls``. Profile-scoped turns (``get_hermes_home_override()`` set) bypass the process-global cache — a multiplex gateway serves several profiles in one process; the first profile's opt-out must not disable blocking for later ones.T)r _resolve_allow_private_urls_allow_private_resolved_cached_allow_privater$r%r _global_allow_private_urlsros1  !-*,, "9=?Z?\6!6  r%cHtjddjj}|dvry|dvry ddlm}|}d D]C}|j |i}t|ts&t|j d d sCy y#t$rYywxYw) zFResolve the effective private-URL toggle from the active config scope.HERMES_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS>1yestrueT>0nofalseFrread_raw_config)securitybrowserallow_private_urls)default) rgetenvr0r5hermes_cli.configrzrr.dictr Exception)env_valrzcfgsectionblocks r rlrlsii3R8>>@FFHG&&&& 5. GGGGR(E%&?599EY;Zdi+j      s#4B3BBB B! 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Empty by default: no host gets the exemption unless it declares one, and the sentinel range keeps the ordinary private-address verdict otherwise. rryr{fake_ip_rangesNr$F)strictz6Ignoring unparseable security.fake_ip_ranges entry: %rc3zK|]2}|jjk(sj|s/|4ywr)versionoverlaps)rrnets r r!z*_resolve_fake_ip_ranges..s2pA199PSP[P[C[`c`l`lmn`oaps ;;;zNIgnoring security.fake_ip_ranges entry %r: it overlaps %s, which stays blocked)rrzrr.rrr/listtuplerbrcr0r3loggerwarningr^_FAKE_IP_UNDECLARABLE_NETWORKSappend)rzrr@entriesnetworksentryclashrs @r _resolve_fake_ip_rangesrs5!%%j"5-7t-Deii()$"#s+se 3u 8V\^GH  &&s5z'7'7'9%HCp!?prvw   NNkmrty z   ?   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