+ jHjRt^RIHt^RIt^RIt^RIt^RIt^RIHt^RI H t ^RI H t ^RI Ht^RIHt^RIHtHt]!0R)m4t]!R R 04t]!0R*m4t]P4!4t]P8!]4t]P>R /t ^R I!H"t#^R I!H$t%^RI!H&t'RRlt(Rt)R+RRllt*Rt+RRlt,RRlt-RRlt.Rt/R,t0Rt1RRlt2R-RR llt3R!R"lt4R#R$lt5R%R&lt6!R'R(4t7R#).aOUser-authorization mixin for ``GatewayRunner``: may this user/chat talk to the agent, the per-adapter DM policy, the unauthorized-DM behavior, and the bot loop guard. ``gateway.run`` is never imported at module import time (cycle). The unauthorized-DM method still logs through ``gateway.run``'s logger so its records keep that name. ) annotationsN)Path)Optional) BotLoopGuard)Platform) SessionSource)expand_whatsapp_aliasesnormalize_whatsapp_identifiergroupforumTELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS)decode_json_list_literal)extra_or_secret)platform_gate_envc V^8dQhRRRR/#namestrreturnbool)formats"8/home/ubuntu/.hermes/hermes-agent/gateway/authz_mixin.py __annotate__r,s..c.d.cB\V4P4\9#N) _auth_envlower_TRUTHY)rs&r _env_truthyr!,s T? "g --rc ^RIHpV!WV4#)z`Late-bound :func:`gateway.platform_env.authz_field` (entry field, else the bundled declaration).) authz_field)gateway.platform_envr#)rfieldentry_fields&&& rr#r#0s: $u %%rcV^8dQhRR/#)rrrr)rs"rrr6sllSlrcvVfR#\VPRT;'g \V44;'gR#)z`The platform's group-chat allowlist env name (``PlatformEntry.group_allowed_chats_env``), or "".group_allowed_chats_env)r#value_registry_entry)platformr&s&&r_group_chat_envr/6s6 x~~'@%BdBd?[cKd e k kikkrchVfR#\P!\4;_uu_4^RIHpV!4RRR4\P!\4;_uu_4^RIHpVPVP4uuRRR4# +'giL^;i +'giR#;i)zPlatform-registry entry for a (plugin) platform, or None. Discovers first (idempotent): the allowlist env names live only on the entry, so an undiscovered process must not read "no list".Ndiscover_plugins)platform_registry) contextlibsuppress Exceptionhermes_cli.pluginsr2gateway.platform_registryr3getr,)r.r2r3s& rr-r-=ss   Y ' '7 (   Y ' '? $$X^^4 ( ' ( ' ( ' sB !!B  B B1 cV^8dQhRR/#rrset[str]r)rs"rrrLsJJhJrcVf \4#\V4p\V\4'dKVUu0uF=p\ V4P 4'gK$\ V4P 4kK? up#\ V4P R4Uu0uF*qP 4'gKVP 4kK, up#uupiuupi)zjParse an allowlist (YAML list, JSON list literal string, or comma-separated scalar) into a set of strings.,)set_decode_json_list_literal isinstancelistrstripsplit)rawparts& r_coerce_allow_setrGLs {u #C (C#t.1GcdSY__5F!D !cGG%(X^^C%8 I%8TJJLLDJJL%8 IIH Is!C C C2Cc$V^8dQhRRRRRR/#)rallowedr< candidate Optional[str]rrr)rs"rrrVs!22X2-2D2rc$RV9;'gW9#)*r)rIrJs&&r_allowsrNVs '> 1 1Y11rcV^8dQhRR/#rrdictr)rs"rrrZsJJdJrcF\\VRR4RR4;'g/#)configNextragetattr)adapters&r_adapter_config_extrarXZs" 77Hd3Wd C I IrIr qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7lc^pVF[pV^, pVR,^,V, p\\4F%wrEYV, ^,'dTM^,pK' K] V#)i) enumerate_BECH32_GENERATOR)valueschkr,topigens& r_bech32_polymodrcgs\ CRiY1$u, 12FA 1H>>3 1C3 JrcV^8dQhRR/#)rhrprr)rs"rrrqsIICIrcVUu.uFp\V4^, NK up^.,VUu.uFp\V4^,NK up,#uupiuupi))ord)recs& r_bech32_hrp_expandrjqsL!$ %ACFaKK % +C.HCqs1v{{C.H HH %.Hs AAc$V^8dQhRRRRRR/#)rfrombitsinttobitspadrr)rs"rrrus!crc^p^p.p^V,^, pVF`pV^8gW, 'dR#WA,V,pWQ, pWR8gK:WR,pVPWE, V,4K0 V'd0V'd(VPWBV, ,V,4V#V'g%WQ8gWBV, ,V,'dR#V#)N)append) datarlrnroaccbitsretmaxvr,s &&&& r _convertbitsrxus C D C K1 D 19**%' n ND JJ t+ , t CTM*d23 Jd&CTM,Bd+J+J Jrc V^8dQhRRRR/#)rnpubrrrKr)rs"rrrs  s } rcVP4P4pVPR4'gR#V\R4RUu.uFp\P V4NK pp\\R4T,4^8wdR#\TRR^^RR7pTe\T4^ 8wdR#\T4P4#uupi \ dR#i;i)uHDecode an ``npub1…`` bech32 string to a 64-char hex pubkey, else None.npub1NrzF)roi) rCr startswithlen_BECH32_CHARSETindex ValueErrorrcrjrxbyteshex)rzrirsdecodeds& r _npub_to_hexrs ::<   D ??7 # #26s7|}2EF2EQ%%a(2EF)&1D89Q>49a6G#g,", >   G s#C C 'C C C C c V^8dQhRRRR/#)rentriesr?rr)rs"rrrskkCkCkrc\V4VUu0uF@qP4PR4'gK)\V4;p'gK>VkKB up,#uupi)uHAdd the hex form of every valid ``npub1…`` entry; invalid entries are kept as-is. Hex entries pass through unchanged; each valid ``npub1…`` entry is decoded and its 64-char hex form added, so either form authorizes the same identity (#78428). Invalid entries are kept as-is (they simply never match an inbound hex pubkey). r|)r?rr}r)rehs& r_normalize_nostr_allow_entriesrsL w/_principal_matches_allowlist..s#Zk$A!$D$DksNbuzzrz)r.rWHATSAPPWHATSAPP_CLOUDr?unionupdater_normalize_whatsapp_identifieraddr,rr}rr)sourcerr check_idsnormalized_user_idplatform_valuehex_users&&& r_principal_matches_allowlistrs I8,,h.E.EFFekk#Zk#Z[jj_j 6w?@;GD  MM, -.4oo.IV__**tN  5[A ,3,>,>v,F,F<(D  MM( #  ' ((rc]tRt^tRtRRltRRltRBRRlltR R ltR R lt R Rlt RRlt Rt RRlt RRltRRltRRltRRltRRltRRltR R!ltR"R/R#R$lltR%R&ltR'R(ltR)R*ltR+R,ltR-R.ltR/R0ltR1R2ltR3R4ltR5R6ltR7R8ltR9R:/R;R<llt R=R>lt!R"R/R?R@llt"RAt#R#)CGatewayAuthorizationMixinz6User/chat authorization methods for ``GatewayRunner``.cV^8dQhRR/#rPr)rs"rr&GatewayAuthorizationMixin.__annotate__s5545rc 0\VRR4;'g/#)adaptersNrUselfs&r_primary_adapters+GatewayAuthorizationMixin._primary_adaptersstZ.44"4rcV^8dQhRR/#rPr)rs"rrrs>>t>rc 0\VRR4;'g/#)_profile_adaptersNrUrs&r_profile_adapters_map/GatewayAuthorizationMixin._profile_adapters_mapst0$7==2=rNc V^8dQhRRRR/#)rr.Optional[Platform]profilerKr)rs"rrrsAA/AAMArc VV'gR#VPV4PV4#)zLive adapter whose intake policy gates authorization (``_adapters_for_profile`` for the profile rule). ``None`` when the profile has no adapter for *platform*. N)_adapters_for_profiler9)rr.rs&&&r_authorization_adapter0GatewayAuthorizationMixin._authorization_adapters&))'266x@@rc V^8dQhRRRR/#)rrrKrrQr)rs"rrrsSS]StSrc T;'gRP4;'gRpV'dVR8XdVP4#VP4pW#9d:W2,pV'gVPV4'gV#VP4#\ VRR4pV'g<\ P !\4;_uu_4VP4pRRR4W%8XdVP4#/# +'giL(;i)uPThe live adapter map *profile* may deliver through: ``_profile_adapters[p]`` for a secondary, ``self.adapters`` only for the primary/default. ``_profile_adapters`` is consulted BEFORE the active profile name: multiplex turns override ``HERMES_HOME`` so ``_active_profile_name()`` reports the secondary profile mid-turn, and treating it as primary would hand it the default bot. A named profile with no map gets ``{}`` — fail closed: a secondary whose adapter failed to connect must NOT fall back to the default profile's adapter (replies, tool sends, marker-file notices out the wrong bot).r*Ndefault_primary_profile_name) rCrr_is_shared_bot_satelliterVr4r5r6_active_profile_name)rr profile_nameprofile_adaptersrprimary_profiles&& rr/GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapters_for_profiles 2,,.66$ |y8))+ +557  +'5Ht<<\JJ))+ +!$(?F$$Y//"&";";"=0+7+Jt%%'RPRR0/s C;; D c V^8dQhRRRR/#)rrrrrr)rs"rrrsSTrc a\VRR4p\VRR4'gR#\VRR4;'g/PS4'dR#\VRR4;'g.p\;QJdV3RlV4F 'gK RM RM!V3RlV44'gR#^R IHpSV!V4UUu0uFwrVVkK upp9#uuppi \ dR#i;i) a6A served profile with NO adapter of its own that a ``profile_routes`` entry targets through the default profile's bot: it drains through the primary's adapters (gateway/AGENTS.md). Its ``_profile_adapters`` entry is the ``{}`` startup placeholder; a secondary connected on ANY platform is its own credential boundary and never borrows the primary. Restored/cached sources carry no transport ref, so this is what keeps heartbeats, completions and goal notices for such a profile deliverable after a restart (the same rule ``kanban_watchers_notifier`` and cron apply).rSNmultiplex_profilesF_profile_failed_platformsprofile_routesc3<"TF=qP;'d&VPS8H;'dVPRJxK? R#5ir)enabledr bot_profile)rrrs& rrEGatewayAuthorizationMixin._is_shared_bot_satellite..s<e^dYZ99TTl!:TTq}}PT?TT^dsAAAT)_multiplex_profile_homes)rVr9any gateway.runrr6)rrrSroutesrr_homes&f rr2GatewayAuthorizationMixin._is_shared_bot_satellitesx.v3U;; D5t < B B G G U U!148>>Bse^dessse^deee8  C CC C&%C&cV^8dQhRR/#rrOptional[SessionSource]r)rs"rrrs""*A"rc pVfR#VPV4pVe V^,#\VRR4RJd.VP4P\P 4#\VRR4p^RIHpV!V4pVenVP'd\V\P8XdVP'g5V'd+VPVP4PV4#R#\\VRR4RR4'g*V'd VP4PV4#R#R#) uThe adapter that RECEIVED *source*'s event — the only one whose intake policy (ignored channels, relay fronting, re-dispatch of a still-live event) may act on it. Live provenance only: the registered transport that built the source, the process-level RelayAdapter for relay-delivered events, or the receiving bot named by a pinned ``RoutingIdentity`` (``transport_profile``) when its adapter reconnected. A source with none of these (restored row, hand-built) fails closed under multiplexing — nothing can say which bot admitted it, and guessing the runtime profile's bot is exactly the shared-bot / route-override confusion the identity exists to end. A standalone gateway owns one adapter per platform, so that adapter is the receiver by construction. Ndelivered_via_upstream_relayFTr. identity_ofrSr) _transport_ownerrVrr9rRELAYgateway.session_identityr multiplexedLOCALtransport_inferredrtransport_profile)rrownerr.ridentitys&& r_intake_adapter_for-GatewayAuthorizationMixin._intake_adapter_fors  >%%f-  8O 695 AT I))+//? ?6:t48v&  X%9%9%9!X^^38S8S8S[c4--h.H.HIMMhW mim mwtXt46JERR=E4))+//9 O4 OrcV^8dQhRR/#rr)rs"rrr'spp,Cprc VfR#VPV4pVeV#^RIHpV!V4pVe'VP'dVP'gR#VP \ VRR4\ VRR44#)uThe adapter that ANSWERS *source*: sends, edits, typing, progress, pickers, pending slots. The receiving bot whenever it is known (:meth:`_intake_adapter_for` — a routed event replies through the bot that received it, whether the runtime is a shared-bot satellite or a profile with a bot of its own). With no live provenance the unique owner of ``(platform, runtime_profile)`` delivers — ``_adapters_for_profile`` holds one adapter per platform per profile, a shared-bot satellite drains through the primary, and a disconnected secondary fails closed to ``{}`` rather than borrowing the default bot. Restored sessions, cron, kanban and completion notices all rely on this row. Matrix: gateway/AGENTS.md § Profile scope. Nrr.r)rrrrrrrV)rrrWrrs&& r_delivery_adapter_for/GatewayAuthorizationMixin._delivery_adapter_for's >**62  N 9v&  H$8$8$8A\A\A\**76:t+LgV\^gimNnoorc WP4PV4JdR#VP4P4Fwr4WPV4JgKRV3u# R#)zMReturn (registered, profile) for a live adapter: profile is None for primary.T)TN)FN)rr9ritems)rrWr.rrs&&& r_owning_profile)GatewayAuthorizationMixin._owning_profileEse ,,.228< < )-)C)C)E)K)K)M %G..x88W}$*NrcV^8dQhRR/#rrrr)rs"rrrNs : :} :rc \VRR4p\V4'dV!4MRp\VRR4pVeVfR#VPW44wrVV'dW63#R#)ax``(adapter, profile)`` of the registered adapter that created *source*, if retained; else None. ``source.profile`` may differ from the adapter profile when one shared credential serves several routed runtimes; ``build_source`` keeps the receiving adapter as provenance so replies stay on that transport. Restored/hand-built sources fall back (fail-closed) to profile lookup. _transport_adapter_refNr.)rVcallabler)rr adapter_refrWr. registeredrs&& rr*GatewayAuthorizationMixin._transport_ownerNsdf&>E #+K#8#8+-d6:t4 ?h."227E %/!9T9rcV^8dQhRR/#rr)rs"rrr]s((](rc ^RIHpV!V4pVe!VP'd VP#R#\ VRR4pVe \ V4#\ \ VRR4RR4'gR#VP V4pVfR#VPV\ VRR44wrgVf^RIH pV!4#^R I H p V !V4#) u5HERMES_HOME whose allowlist admits *source*: the identity's transport home (or the ingress-stamped one), else the home of the profile owning the adapter that delivers it. ``None`` = authorize in the ambient scope (multiplex off, or no live adapter — the check then fails closed on its own). Inside a routed satellite's turn the ambient scope is the satellite's, whose ``.env`` has no token/allowlist; every authorization decision made mid-turn (``/topic``, sibling ``/stop``, plugin injection, voice, auto-resume) must read the admitting bot's allowlist instead.rN_authorization_profile_homerSrFr.)get_process_hermes_home)get_profile_dir) rrrauthorization_homerVrrrhermes_constantsrhermes_cli.profilesr) rrrrstampedrW _registeredrrrs && r_authorization_home_for_source8GatewayAuthorizationMixin._authorization_home_for_source]s 9v&  2:2F2F2F8.. PD P&"?F  = wtXt46JERR,,V4 ?#33GWVZY]=^_ ? @*, ,7w''rc V^8dQhRRRR/#)rrrrrKr)rs"rrr{s 0 0- 0M 0rc VPV4pVe V^,#^RIHpV!V4pVe2VP'd VPR8XdR#VP#\ VRR4#)z@Resolve the transport-owning profile for adapter policy lookups.Nrrr)rrrrrrV)rrrrrs&& r_adapter_profile_for_source5GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_profile_for_source{sl%%f-  8O8v&  H$8$8$8#55B4 bHbHb bvy$//rcV^8dQhRR/#)rrrr)rs"rrrs  )@ rc  b\VRR4pVfR#^RIHpV!W \VRR4R7V#)u``entry.origin`` with its identity re-pinned from the routing entry's persisted ``transport_profile`` (no live adapter: the restored row of the transport matrix). Every path that revives a session from durable state — auto-resume, heartbeat restore, plugin injection, background-process events — reads the origin through here, so the receiving bot decides delivery and authorization after a restart, not the runtime profile's heuristics.originN)restore_identityr)runnerr)rVrr)rr&rrs&& r_restored_source*GatewayAuthorizationMixin._restored_sources7 $/ >=Obdh@ij rc V^8dQhRRRR/#rr)rs"rrrsKKCKTKrc zV'gR#VPW4pVRJ;'d\\WBR44#)uAdapter-declared boolean, False when unknown. ``authorization_is_upstream`` (relay: a trusted authenticated upstream decides) is honored directly; ``enforces_own_access_policy`` (WeCom, Weixin, Yuanbao, QQBot, WhatsApp gate at intake) is NOT "already authorized" — those adapters default to ``open``, so ``_is_user_authorized`` only trusts them under an actual ``allowlist`` policy.FN)rrrV)rr.rrrWs&&&& r _adapter_flag'GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_flags9 --h@d"JJtGG5,I'JJrcV^8dQhRR/#rPr)rs"rrrs888rc \\VRR4RR4pVe\VPV4RR4MRp\V\4'dV#/#)z@``config.platforms[platform].extra`` as a dict ({} when absent).rSN platformsrT)rVr9rArQ)rr.rrTs&& r _config_extra'GatewayAuthorizationMixin._config_extrasOGD(D9;M CLCX h/$?^b"5$//u7R7rc V^8dQhRRRR/#)rattrr extra_keyr)rs"rrrsssrc VPW4pVe \WRR4MRpVf!VPV4PV4pV#)zLive adapter's resolved ``attr`` (folds in the ``_*`` env override), else ``config.extra[extra_key]`` for bare runners with no adapter.N)rrVrr9)rr.rrrrWr,s&&&&& r_adapter_setting*GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_settingsL--h@070Ct, =&&x044Y?E rc V^8dQhRRRR/#)rkindrrr)rs"rrrsxxcxsxrc V'gR#\VPVRV R2V R2V4;'gR4P4P4#)zLowercased effective ``dm_policy`` (open/allowlist/disabled/pairing) or ``group_policy`` (open/allowlist/disabled) for *kind* in {"dm", "group"}; ``""`` if unknown.r*__policy)rrrCr)rr.rrs&&&&r_adapter_policy)GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_policysR4((QtfG3DgFVX_`ffdfgmmouuwwrrc(V^8dQhRRRRRRRR/#)rr.rchat_idrKrrrr)rs"rrrs2pp*p5BpP]p prc aV'd V'gR#VPVRRV4p\V\4'gR#\V4pVP V4p\V\4'gDVP 4o\ V3RlVP44VP R44p\V\4'gR#VP R4;'gVP R4p\V\4'd\VP44#\V\\\34;'d5\;QJdRV4F 'gK R # R#!RV44#) zWhether a per-group sender allowlist (WeCom ``groups..allow_from``) gated this message: a group may be open at the chat level while restricting senders, so reaching the gateway means the adapter already checked that list.F_groupsgroupsc3<"TFPwr\V\4'gKVP4S8XgK4\V\4'gKLVxKR R#5ir)rArrrQ)rkvlowereds& rrPGatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_group_has_sender_allowlist..s<u~tqAs1C U\H\aklmosat~sAAA ArM allow_from allowFromc3T"TFp\V4P4xK R#5ir)rrC)ritems& rrr+s!CobnZ^CIOODUDUbns&(T)rrArQrr9rnextrrrCrBtupler?r) rr.r#rr& chat_id_str group_cfg sender_allowr*s &&&$ @r#_adapter_group_has_sender_allowlist=GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_group_has_sender_allowlists w&&xHgN&$'''l JJ{+ )T**!'')Guv||~u 3I)T** }}\2PPimmK6P lC ( ( **,- -,uc(:;ooCobnCoooCobnCo@oorcV^8dQhRR/#rr)rs"rrrstttrc \VRR4;'g/p\VRR4pV'dW29d W#,#\VRR4#)zNPer-profile PairingStore for a source, else the global ``self.pairing_store``.pairing_storesNr pairing_storerU)rr per_profilers&& r_pairing_store_for,GatewayAuthorizationMixin._pairing_store_forsHd$4d;AAr &)T2'.73I{#swW[]lnrOssrcV^8dQhRR/#rPr)rs"rrrsII4Irc 6\VPV44#r)rXr)rrs&&r_adapter_extra_for_source3GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_extra_for_sources$T%?%?%GHHrcV^8dQhRR/#)rrzOptional[bool]r)rs"rrrsTbrc V'd1VPVPVPVR7'dR#TPVPV'dRMRV4R8wdR#V'gSVP VPVR7pVe\ VRR4MRp\ V4'd\V!V44#R#)uOwn-policy adapter verdict when no env allowlist exists; None = no verdict. Trusted only when the effective policy for THIS chat type is ``allowlist``: ``open`` forwards EVERY sender (the fail-open SECURITY.md §2.6 forbids), ``disabled`` never forwards, ``pairing`` forwards unpaired DMs for the handshake (already denied by the pairing-store check). Anything else → default-deny. )rTr dm allowlistN_is_dm_allowed)r5r.r#r rrVrr)rrris_groupadapter_profilerWdm_checks&&&&& r_own_policy_authorizes0GatewayAuthorizationMixin._own_policy_authorizess @@RXR`R`jy@zz   H$P_ `do o11&//?1[GCJCVww(8$?\`H!!HW-..rcV^8dQhRR/#)rrrr)rs"rrrs))PT)rc VPV4pVfR#\V4pTPV'dRMR4pV'gN\VP4p\ VPP RV4'dVPR4pV'gR#\V4p\VRR4p \V 4'd!VUu0uFqy!V4;'gTkK pp\W4#uupi)z}Adapters (e.g. Telegram) that gate via config.extra.allow_from / group_allow_from without setting enforces_own_access_policy.NFgroup_allow_fromr,allowed_users_env allowed_usersnormalize_user_id) rrXr9r-r.r#r,rGrVrrN) rrrrGrWrT adapter_allowr&rI normalizes &&&& r#_adapter_extra_allowlist_authorizes=GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_extra_allowlist_authorizess,,V4 ?%g. "4lS $FOO4E6??002EuMM!& / : #M2G%8$? I  >EFgUy'0050gGFw((Gs C1C1cV^8dQhRR/#r;r)rs"rrrs```rc |R;r#\P!\4;_uu_4VPV4pRRR4\ VRR4p\ V4'd3\P!\4;_uu_4V!4pRRR4\ V\\\\34'g \4#VUu0uFFp\ V\\34'gK!\V4P4;p'gKDVkKH up# +'giL;i +'giL;iuupi)aIDs an adapter resolved from username-shaped allowlist entries at connect time (Discord). The per-turn .env hot-reload restores RAW usernames, so from the second turn on the env allowlist holds usernames while user_id is numeric. Never a widening: the empty-allowlist branch already returned and adapters only resolve operator-written entries. Only called with a non-empty platform allowlist so group/global-only configs never consult adapter memory; type-checked so mocks cannot auto-truthy in. Nresolved_allowlist_user_ids)r4r5r6rrVrrAr? frozensetrBr1rrmrC)rrrW resolved_idsresolverrss&& r_adapter_resolved_allowlist_ids9GatewayAuthorizationMixin._adapter_resolved_allowlist_idss"&%   + +008G,7$A4H H  $$Y//'z 0,iu(EFF5L'_allmentions)rrr.r#r/rNrGrr4r5r6r@r9rVr7r2r#r,r-r_extra_or_secretrrC) rrrHrGr`chat_allowlist_envadapter_group_allowedr2allow_bots_varrTmodes &&&&& r_chat_scoped_grant,GatewayAuthorizationMixin._chat_scoped_grants $  / /4 7!!&//3NP_`` !0!A !g.? J\@].^`f`n`n&o&o$$Y//(,(F(Fv(N(R(RSh(i%(W5FG\5]_e_m_m-n-n0// 68U + +$$Y//? "0))>)>@PRabhbqbqRrsyywyN((33 ::6BE4+E<QWXY__aggi../0//0/ 43s%AH5I I5 I I  I, c V^8dQhRRRR/#)rgroup_user_allowlistrrrr)rs"rrrIs111PT1rc z^RIHpVPR4Uu0uF9qDP4P R4'gK)VP4kK; ppV'gR#\ VRR4'g2VP RRP\V444RVn VPV9#uupi)zTELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS was once (mis)used as a chat-ID allowlist; "-"-prefixed values are chat IDs, honor them and warn once.)loggerr>-F#_warned_telegram_group_users_legacyuTELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS contains chat-ID-shaped values (%s). Treating them as chat IDs for backward compatibility. Move chat IDs to TELEGRAM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS — the _USERS var is now for sender user IDs.T) rrtrDrCr}rVwarningjoinsortedrvr#)rrrrrtr)legacy_chat_idss&&& r_legacy_telegram_chat_grant5GatewayAuthorizationMixin._legacy_telegram_chat_grantIs '.B.H.H.Mk.MQXQXQZQeQefiQj91779.MktBEJJ NN.01  8=3?>AE0+ u +* s "A A c V^8dQhRRRR/#)rrrrr1r)rs"rrrdsee=eUerc VP'dVPPMRpVPV4;'gRT\VP;'gR43#)r*)r.r,rrr#)rrr.s&& r_bot_loop_guard_conversation6GatewayAuthorizationMixin._bot_loop_guard_conversationdsM,2OOO6??((008>>B#fnnNbNb`bJcddrc V^8dQhRRRR/#)rrrrrr)rs"rrris   4 rc F\VRR4'gR#VP4PVPV44wr#VR8XdU\P RVP 'dVP PMRVPVP4V#)zCount one authorized bot-authored inbound message. False when it trips the budget or the chat is cooling down. The inbound handler calls this once per message; ``_is_user_authorized`` only peeks because it is asked several times.rdFTtrippedzBot loop guard is dropping bot messages in %s chat %s: bot %s sent one message too many for the window, cooling down (gateway.bot_loop_guard in config.yaml).r*) rVradmitrrtrwr.r,r#r)rrrIstates&& r_admit_bot_message,GatewayAuthorizationMixin._admit_bot_messageisvx//668>>t?`?`ag?hi I  NNX)/%%b&..RXR`R`  rr`Tc$V^8dQhRRRRRR/#rrrr`rrr)rs"rrrws( f f- fVZ ffj frc VPWR7'gR#\VRR4'gR#VP4PVP V44'*#)ahWhether a user may use the bot. Order: trusted-upstream delegation, chat-scoped group allowlists, ``{PLATFORM}_ALLOW_BOTS``, per-platform allow-all, adapter role auth, pairing store, env/config allowlists, ``GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS``, default deny. A bot-authored message that any of these admits is still refused while its chat's loop guard is cooling down. )r`FrdT)_principal_authorizedrVrblockedr)rrr`s&&$r_is_user_authorized-GatewayAuthorizationMixin._is_user_authorizedwsV))&)ddvx//002::4;\;\]c;deeerc$V^8dQhRRRRRR/#rr)rs"rrrs-D`D`MD`X\D`aeD`rc @^RIHpV!W4pVeV#VP\P8Xg%\ \ VP4RR4RJdR#VPV4pVP\9pVP\9pVPWWb4'dR#VPpV'gR#\ VP4p \VPPRV 4;'gRp \VPPRV 4;'gRp V 'd\V 4'dR#V'd\ VRR4RJdR#VP!V4p V eCT P#VP'dVPPMRV4'dR#\%V 4p V'd*\%\&P)VPR44MRpV'd \%\+VPV 44MRp\%R 4pV 'gV'gyV'gqV'giV'd<VP-VPR V4'dVP/WWe4pVeV#VP1WV4'dR#\R 4#V'dVP2'dpV'd(\5\7V4VP24'dR#VP\P88Xd"V'dVP;W4'dR#\7V 4\7V4,\7V4,pV 'dVVP=V4,pR V9;'g \?WV4#) z7The allowlist verdict alone, before the bot loop guard.)authorize_local_sourcetrusted_inboundFTrOr* allow_all_envrole_authorizedGATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERSenforces_own_access_policyGATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERSrM) gateway.session_localrr.rWEBHOOKrVr-r chat_type_GROUP_CHAT_TYPES_GROUP_FORUM_TYPESrorr#r,r!r< is_approvedr_GROUP_USER_ENVr9r/rrJrTr#rNrGTELEGRAMr{r]r)rrr`r local_verdictrHrGis_group_or_forumrr&platform_allow_envplatform_allow_all_varr:platform_allowlistrrgroup_chat_allowlistglobal_allowlistverdictrs&&$ rr/GatewayAuthorizationMixin._principal_authorizeds@.t<  $  ??h.. .'/&//:Z\mot2uy}2}::6B##'88",,0BB  " "6H _ _..0()>)>@SUZ[aa_a!,V__-B-BOUZ![!a!a_a !k2H&I&I #8I5(QUY(Y//7  $)B)B\b\k\k\k6??CXCXqsu|)})}&'9:Vgy)<)RVf'D,>,>vPln},~,~55fxa&"N77RR89 9 #0ABV0WY_YgYg(h(h8#4#449M44VRR 0 1 45 6 01 2   4??G GKk!__%A&S^%__rc$V^8dQhRRRRRR/#)rr.rrrKrrr)rs"rrrs$**6H*Vc*or*rc \VRR4pV'dB\VR4'd0V'd(RVPV49dVPV4#V\P 8XdR#V'd0\VR4'dVP R8wd VP #R.pV'dVPVRV4pV'gP\VPV4PR 4;'gR 4P4P4pVR 8XdR#VR9dR#\V4p\VPR V4'dC\VPR V4;'gR \PV4\!W4.VOp\";QJdRV4F 'gK RM RM !RV44'dR#R#)uHow unauthorized DMs are handled ("pair" / "ignore" / "decline") for a platform. Order: explicit per-platform config; Email → "ignore" (inboxes hold arbitrary mail); explicit non-default global; adapter dm_policy (pairing → "pair", allowlist/disabled → "ignore"); any configured allowlist → "ignore" (spamming unknown contacts with codes is noisy and leaks); else "pair". 1. 2. Email defaults to ``"ignore"`` unless explicitly opted into pairing. 3. Explicit global ``unauthorized_dm_behavior`` in config — wins for chat-shaped platforms when no per-platform override is set. 4. When an adapter-level DM policy opts into pairing or silent drop, honor it. 5. When an allowlist (``PLATFORM_ALLOWED_USERS``, ``PLATFORM_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS`` / ``PLATFORM_GROUP_ALLOWED_CHATS``, or ``GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS``) is configured, default to ``"ignore"`` — the allowlist signals that the owner has deliberately restricted access; spamming unknown contacts with pairing codes is both noisy and a potential info-leak. (#9337) 6. rSNget_unauthorized_dm_behaviorunauthorized_dm_behaviorignorepairrrD dm_policyr*pairingallowlist_suppresses_pairingrOc3f"TF'q;'d\V4P4xK) R#5ir)rrC)rkeys& rrJGatewayAuthorizationMixin._get_unauthorized_dm_behavior..s&H#--y~++--s 1"1TF>disabledrE)rVhasattrrrrEMAILrr rr9rCrr-r#r,rr/r)rr.rrSallowlist_keysrr&s&&$ r_get_unauthorized_dm_behavior7GatewayAuthorizationMixin._get_unauthorized_dm_behaviors|x. wv'EFF8*d.@.@.JJ66x@ @ x~~ % gf&@AAfFeFeioFo22 212 ,,XtWEI 2 28 < @ @ M S SQSTZZ\bbd I%55#H-E8>>+I5QQ"-hnn>QSX"Y"_"_]_"1"5"5h"?QYAa"tdr"t 3HH333HH H Hr)rrvr)$__name__ __module__ __qualname____firstlineno____doc__rrrrrrrrrrrr rrrr r5r<r@rJrTr]ror{rrrrrr__static_attributes__rrrrrs@ 5>AS0,"Hp< :(< 0 K8 xp`dp4t I,)6`(,\1$e  f]a fD`L*fj**rr>r r channel>1yestruer)iWj;imP&ii3B=ib*)T)8r __future__rr4loggingos threadingpathlibrtypingrgateway.bot_loop_guardrgateway.configrgateway.sessionrgateway.whatsapp_identityrrr rrYrrr Lockr getLoggerrrtrrgateway.platforms._sharedr r@rrjrrr!r#r/r-rGrNrXrr]rcrjrxrrrrrrrrs# /#) ;<12 ( )%NN,   8 $ $$&DE\ID.& l J2J5PI( "k):uur